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I want to start off with a statement from Pauline Hanson:
‘I think the most downtrodden person in this country is the white Anglo-Saxon male.’
This paper partly arises from the bewilderment I felt when I first came across statements such as
Hanson’s. Undoubtedly being a feminist gave me some additional insights into why this statement
was so bizarre. However, I’m also from an Anglo-Celtic heritage and, as a citizen with ordinary
powers of observation, never mind as a social scientist, this statement seemed extraordinary. I can
well understand why those Anglo-Celtic males who have lost their jobs in manufacturing industry,
or who are about to lose their farms, or even their middle management positions feel downtrodden. I
can understand the terror  of the  information poor.  However,  what  does  an Anglo-Celtic  ethnic
identity have to do with any of these people? Had Hanson not noticed that the vast majority of
politicians were not only white but had Anglo-Celtic surnames? Hadn’t she noticed that the majority
of powerful people in the business world also appeared to be not merely white but Anglo-Celtic?
Obviously not. Apparently she saw the world in exactly opposite ways to me and many others. If I
was somewhat  gobsmacked (to  use  a word from my heritage) by her  perceptions,  I could  just
imagine how many Indigenous Australians would feel. No wonder Marcia Langton has long used
terms like ‘psychotic’ to describe the delusional attitudes and actions of significant parts of white
Australia.
However, one of my key arguments in this paper is that, unfortunately, we cannot afford to dismiss
these arguments just because we see them as wildly inaccurate and very bizarre. We can’t dismiss
them, not only because it is always worth trying to understand where someone else’s view is coming
from, but, in particular, we can’t ignore these views because they have such force today, because the
mobilisation of conservative Anglo identities (many Celts must have been happy to have been left
out of Hanson’s characterisations on that particular occasion) is so powerful in Australia today. At
the  time  I  opened  my  Sydney  Morning  Herald colour  supplement  and  came  across  Hanson’s
statement, I was in the middle of a project that would involve me spending four years reading John
Howard’s  speeches,  and  would  eventually produce  my recent  book,  Governing  Change:  From
Keating to Howard. There were obvious connections with statements such as this by Hanson and
Howard’s own attack on the power of politically correct, ‘special interests’ which, according to him,
had gained power over the interests of ‘mainstream Australia’. Howard has even to some extent
acknowledged this: ‘There has been I believe in the Australian community a deep seated rejection of
the politically correct and distorted view of Australian history and I have played a major role myself
in rejecting that very negative view of Australian history and to some extent, she’s [Hanson’s] also
tapping  into  that.’  Indeed,  the  nearest  Howard  can  come  to  acknowledging  a  history  of
dispossession and genocide is to refer to ‘blemishes’ in Australian history, a term which, as Judith
Brett so cogently points out, condenses ‘in that small word ... the forbidden thought that it’s their
blemished skin colour that has blemished our reputation.’ In this topsy-turvy mirror world inhabited
by Howard, the ‘Aboriginal industry’ appeared to have more power than big business. Something
called the ‘politically correct’, cultural ‘elite’, which I had a terrible feeling latte-swilling readers of
the  Sydney Morning Herald colour supplement like myself belonged to, had apparently captured
Keating government policy, trampling over the interests of something else called ‘the mainstream’.
Even worse, some members of the Labor Party seemed to be under the impression that Howard was
right about who would controlled the Keating government agenda and that’s why they had lost
office in 1996.
To  make  matters  even  more  difficult,  critics  of  Hanson’s  or  Howard’s  views  were  potentially
silenced because, if they responded by saying Hanson et als’ statements were totally inaccurate,
they’d just confirm their ‘politically correct’ elitist credentials. They’d confirm they were heaping
muck on ordinary people, because in this topsy-turvy world the Liberal Party was the champion of
battlers. The ‘fair go’ had been captured by white, Anglo-Celts, (as McKenzie Wark points out so
astutely in his analysis of Hanson). The dominant groups in society were now the oppressed; the
disadvantaged  and  marginalised  were  the  oppressors  —  the  shameless  advocates  of  ‘special
interests’. The political, media and business elites that I’d criticise for obstructing social change, for
largely excluding both the non-white and the non-Anglo-Celtic, were now apparently the champions
of anti-racism and anti-ethnocentrism.
I can’t analyse these issues in detail here and I’m assuming this audience is more than familiar with
them. However, if you want more detailed analyses see my book Governing Change and Andrew
Markus’s book,  Race: John Howard and the Remaking of Australia and Ghassan Hage’s  White
Nation.
Ghassan Hage has termed this discourse, ‘the discourse of Anglo-decline’, in which the privilege of
Anglo-Celts is seen as being increasingly under threat and the issue becomes how to manage the
‘others’.  Hage  is  right  about  that.  However,  what  I’ve  termed  myself  the  ‘Revenge  of  the
Mainstream’ discourse is, in a sense, just as much about policing whites and Anglo-Celts as it is
about managing the racial and ethnic ‘other’. It is about asserting a particular form of Anglo-Celtic
identity and trying to repress those Anglo-Celts with other views, that is the so-called ‘politically
correct’.  The price of all  of this  was not just  the reinforcement  of power and privilege but the
suborning other less powerful groups into racist projects. For the other side of the arguments about
cultural  elites was ,  in my view, the quite offensive assumption that  articulating racism was an
evocation of white Anglo working class identity, just as much as criticising racism was apparently
an evocation of upper class cosmopolitanism.
So, to return to the central focus of this paper, how do you undertake a Treaty process in this topsy-
turvy world? How do you get Anglo-Celts to support politicians coming to the negotiating table
when the arguments about justice and injustice have been seized by the other side? And why, for
that matter, focus on Australian Anglo-Celts, who will only be one of the non-Indigenous groups
whose views will influence whether non-Indigenous politicians are prepared to engage in the Treaty
process?
Well  one  reason  I’m concentrating on  Anglo-Celts  is  because  of  my own background  as  one,
because I believe that Anglo-Celts have a particular responsibility, a particular obligation, to deal
with  their  own  kind.  I’ll  leave  it  to  those  non-Indigenous  Australians  with  non-Anglo-Celtic
identities to deal with what the postcolonial form of their identity would be like. Also, I’m focusing
on Anglo-Celts because Anglo-Celtic identity has already been politically mobilised. And I believe
it is particularly important to deal with these issues of Anglo-Celtic identity, not just because people
who claim Anglo-Celtic heritage still  form the majority of Australians and therefore have to be
brought the party on the Treaty process just in numerical terms (77% in the mid-eighties), but also
because, let’s face it, Australia was set up as a British colony. There is a sense in which every non-
Indigenous settler who came here after 1789 was an invader, regardless of ethnicity or race. Those
of us with British heritage have particular links with a colonial heritage to come to terms with, even
those diasporic Britons, like my parents and myself, who came here in the nineteen fifties (I was a
baby). Indeed, given the sort of views still being expressed in Britain today by political leaders who
seem  totally  incapable  of  reflecting  upon  their  own  imperial  history  of  conquest,  killing  and
subjugation, I’d argue that those of Anglo-Celtic descent living in formerly British, colonial settler
societies have a special responsibility to raise issues regarding colonialism not just to the societies
they live in but for the British and English themselves. So, perhaps this is a double opportunity for
Australian Anglo-Celts to deal with what Judith Brett argues is one of the reasons why so many are
loathe to say ‘sorry’ — ‘the way those who emigrated to Australia mourned — or failed to mourn
— the world they left behind; and the intergenerational impact of this as those cut off from their
own pasts brought up their own children.’
That brings me to the issue of why I think a Treaty process is so important. One can make a number
of  historical  arguments  as  to  why  the  Aboriginal  and  Torres  Strait  Islander  peoples  never
surrendered their sovereignty and should therefore be part of Treaty negotiations between sovereign
peoples. One can come up with lots of other arguments why historically a Treaty is justified and
should have taken place in Australia as it  did across the Tasman.  Henry Reynolds  and Marcia
Langton  have  both  tackled  those  issue  of  historical  sovereignty and  Treaties  particularly well.
However, there are also very pressing, contemporary, reasons why a Treaty process is necessary,
particularly because colonialism in Australia is an ongoing process. As Howard’s Wik legislation
showed, we are still working out the colonial settlement. Non-Indigenous Australia is still trying to
impose colonial relations on Indigenous Australia. That is the most important reason why a Treaty
process is still as relevant today as it was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
However, I’m not an expert  on Indigenous politics and I’m not here today to discuss the exact
content of the Treaty, although I think Marcia Langton and Geoff Clark have both set out what some
of the key issues up for negotiation need to be, but I do want to argue that the process of Treaty-
making is an essential part of the process of reconciliation. And I am somewhat of an expert on
white Australian politics. There are useful things I can say about that. Because, I think the problems
in getting a Treaty up, in whatever form/s, will be just immense. In the rest of this paper I want to
talk more about one reason why and about some strategies for trying to do something about it.
I’m concentrating on the problem of Anglo-Celtic identity because I want to make the point that
what Treaty negotiations  are up against is  not  just  the issue of the power of colonial invaders,
including  mining  companies  and  pastoralists;  not  just  the  power  of  subsequent  generations  of
colonial invaders in denial who don’t want to acknowledge who they are or what non-Indigenous
Australians are all still benefitting from — namely Aboriginal and Islander dispossession — but,
even more difficult, a dominant ethnic group whose identity is in crisis. And that is one more reason
why the Treaty process will be such a difficult one. The Treaty process will not just raise issues of
national identity, and of whether it involves negotiations between different nations, Indigenous and
non-Indigenous ones, but it will raise issues for the identity of groups within the non-Indigenous
population and none more so than the Anglo-Celts.
Some  of  you  may  be  wondering  why  I’ve  begun  my  overheads  with  some  quotations  from
contemporary British politicians.
There always used to be something very un-British about trying to define
who the British were. Perhaps that is because we were so sure of ourselves
that we were mildly embarrassed to spell it out. Were we not the people who
could never be conquered, whose empire had brought civilisation to far-off
lands, whose navy kept the sea open, and whose Parliament was the mother
of all Parliaments?’ (William Hague, Conservative Party Leader)
I want the next century to be one where Britain’s worth is measured not in
how  much  of  the  globe  it  owns  or  conquers,  but  measured  by  the
achievements of its citizens, by the sort of people we want to become, the
sort of society we choose to create.’ (Tony Blair, Prime Minister)
Well, obviously I’m giving you some examples of the degree to which the colonial mother culture
doesn’t wish to reflect on legacies of colonialism either. Even more to the point, Hague and Blair’s
statements are part of a British debate over the crisis in British and English identity. Indeed, in
recent years there has been an explosion of popular journalism and writing discussing ‘Britishness’
and ‘Englishness’. Britishness and Englishness have become key issues in the race debate which is
currently  happening  during  the  British  election,  a  debate  which  sometimes,  incidentally,  uses
Howard-type terminology like ‘the mainstream’. (This is not a coincidence given the number of
Australians working on the  Conservative campaign,  Hague’s  visit  to  Australia to  study how to
defeat a sitting labor government and Howard’s address to the 2000 Conservative Party conference
by video-link).
Similarly, in Australia in recent years, there has been considerable interest in issues of Anglo-Celtic
identity. We have seen the publication of Geoffrey Partington’s, The Australian Nation: Its British
and Irish Roots, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997) and the release of Miriam Dixson,
The Imaginary Australian: Anglo-celts and Identity - 1788 to the Present, (Sydney: University of
New South Wales Press, 1999) as well as books which address the issue of Anglo-Celtic Australian
identity through the Race Debate of the late nineties, for example Ghassan Hage’s  White Nation,
(Pluto, Australia 1998) or Jon Stratton’s Race Daze: Australia in Identity Crisis, (Pluto, Australia,
1998). These are also issues I also discuss in my recent book  Governing Change (University of
Queensland Press, 2000).
The explosion of interest in British/English/Anglo-Celtic identity reflects the increasing challenges
facing privileged,  often  previously,  largely unquestioned  identities.  After  all,  British  identity is
having to be reconstructed in the face of rapid social, economic and technological change, including
the  effects  of  globalisation,  being  part  of  the  European  Union,  political  devolution  and  the
increasingly multi-racial nature of Britain today. In Australia, formal colonial ties with Britain are
largely broken (despite relics like the monarchy) and colonial settler and Indigenous Australians are
facing  the  legacies  of  invasion  and  dispossession.  Australians  are  also  facing  the  impact  of
globalisation and rapid social, economic and technological change. Australia is developing closer
ties with its Asian and Pacific neighbours; and massive levels of post-war migration have made
Australia  an  unusually  multicultural  society,  challenging  (but  not  removing)  Anglo-Celtic
dominance. Even in the 1960s, 51% of migrants to Australia were born in the United Kingdom and
Ireland, by the 1990s only 15% of migrants were born in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Given
that  concepts  of  Britishness  and  Englishness  are  under  challenge  in  Britain  itself,  it  is  hardly
surprising that  Australians of Anglo-Celtic origin or descent face even more complex issues of
identity. Indeed, social geographer Doreen Massey has pointed out that, for numerous reasons to do
with social  and economic change,  inhabitants  of first  world countries  are  now facing forms of
insecurity and disorientation once predominantly faced by the colonised or marginalised groups
within first world society. (Obviously, the first world experiences aren’t generally equivalent to the
genocide and dispossession faced by Indigenous Australians ).
So I’m arguing that the sort of mobilisation of conservative, traditional, racist Anglo-Celtic identity
that  we  have  seen  in  Australia  is  part  of  a  broader  crisis  for  dominant  ethnic  identities
internationally. I’m now going to argue that, in order to try to work out some ways of de-mobilising
those traditional identities, we have to look a little more at exactly what is happening. And it is here,
I think that  William Hague’s extraordinary statement  gives us a  clue.  Let us  consider  Hague’s
statement in depth:
There always used to be something very un-British about trying to define
who the British were. Perhaps that is because we were so sure of ourselves
that we were mildly embarrassed to spell it out. Were we not the people who
could never be conquered, whose empire had brought civilisation to far-off
lands, whose navy kept the sea open, and whose Parliament was the mother
of all Parliaments?
Hague’s arguments are obviously important  because of the complete lack of reflection on what
colonialism meant for those who were subjugated, killed and dispossessed. His arguments are also
important because of what he implies about the silences in British identity. Hague virtually admits
that conceptions of Britishness rarely needed to be articulated because of the assumed superiority of
the British. This is also why Englishness was rarely articulated. If conceptions of Britishness did not
need to be spelled out, then even less did the English identity that was so often dominant within it.
However, such silence does become a problem for the British when the assumed dominance begins
to  be  challenged,  even  undermined.  When  British  identity  is  meant  to  become  more  racially
inclusive, then silence becomes a lack and a grievance. Then it becomes a problem that there is no
clear British or English identity separate from the assertion of racial and ethnic privilege that was
one of its defining features. In this sense, challenging superiority can be experienced as robbing the
British or English of their identity. But surely the question then becomes how to develop a sense of
British or English identity that is not dependent upon it being superior. And we should ask the same
question for Australian Anglo-Celtic identity. It’s the very old question for Australian Anglo-Celts
of how we address the ‘whispering in our hearts’, of how we address the essential moral dilemmas
upon which the Australian nation is founded.
Now, I realise that suggesting that it is important to encourage other forms of Anglo-Celtic identity
that are not based on subordination and superiority, forms of Anglo-Celtic identity that see Anglo-
Celts  as  one  ethnic  groups  among  others  in  Australian  society,  that  do  not  see  Anglo-Celtic
‘whiteness’ as synonymous with national identity or Australian core values is a very risky strategy. I
recognise  that  any mobilisation  of  Anglo-Celtic  identity  is  potentially  very dangerous  but  my
argument would be that it has already been mobilised with disastrous results. I don’t want Pauline
Hanson  or  John  Howard  articulating  my identity.  I’d  prefer  not  to  have  an  identity  based  on
psychotic  denial.  I  don’t  want  an  identity  that  is  haunted  by  shameful  silence  and  forbidden
thoughts.  I’d prefer not  to  have an identity based around myths  of peaceful  settlement  and the
pioneering  spirit.  I  don’t  want  a  sense  of  ethnic  identity  that  somehow  manages  to  be  both
exclusively heterosexual and leave out women. I don’t want to have to continually evoke Gallipoli
to  define my identity. Bob Hawke critiqued Howard’s refusal  to take any responsibility for the
actions of past generations by saying we weren’t at Gallipoli either but we identify with that. The
point is that for Howard ‘we’ were, or an idealised youthful masculine Anglo-Celtic digger was.
That is precisely why Gallipoli has such a nostalgic place for the Prime Minister in Anglo-Celtic
longing and narratives of (masculine) nationhood.
I want to argue that politicians who are serious about reconciliation need to engage with conceptions
of  Anglo-Celtic  identity and  articulate  more  positive  ones  — the  other  forms of  Anglo-Celtic
identity that have always been whispering in the background and have sometimes been articulated
more  loudly than  others.  I  would  prefer,  on  those  occasions  when  amongst  my many,  hybrid
identities, I identify as an Australian Anglo-Celt to call on articulations of Anglo-Celtic identity that
say we are the Anglo-Celts prepared to face colonial legacies and ongoing injustices and embrace
reconciliation.  We are  the  Anglo-Celts  who support  the  national  government  being part  of  the
Treaty-making process. We are the Anglo-Celts who showed the British a thing or two about facing
up to the legacies of colonialism. We are the Anglo-Celts who could see ourselves as one ethnicity
amongst many who have contributed to the development of Australian society. I would emphasise
that my view here is very different from that of commentators such as Miriam Dixson, who, despite
her support  for diversity, still  tends to privilege Anglo-Celtic identity when defining Australian
‘core-values’. My argument would be that Australian core values, whatever they are, should not be
equated with Anglo-Celtic identity.
As Paul Keating pointed out years ago, Australian political values can and should include the very
support for diversity that comes from years of multicultural migration. As he also pointed out, the
values of parliamentary democracy (which Howard believes we took from Britain) were given a
particularly Australian slant as,  many years before the British,  we introduced measures  such as
universal male and female suffrage, the secret ballot, payment for MPs. Above all, if Indigenous and
non-Indigenous Australians can be successful in reconciliation and Treaty negotiations, we really
will, finally, be forging a true democracy and truly inclusive values — ones that are very different
from anything that can be claimed to be traditionally English or British. In short,  the forms of
Anglo-Celtic identity I am talking about are precisely ones that DO NOT equate Australian values,
or national identity with Anglo-Celtic identity and break with colonialism.
I realise that to many this may seem incredibly naive, as though it is possible to somehow overcome
the  obvious  on-going  numerical  and  cultural  dominance  of  Anglo-Celts  in  Australian  society.
Realistically, I’d have to say that there is considerable point to that criticism and I’m not overly
sanguine about how much can be achieved. Australian Anglo-Celts are the heirs of empire and of
cultural  dominance  within  Australian  society.  Anglo-Celtic  whiteness  has  been  the  definitive
whiteness. It is very hard, if not impossible, for any Anglo-Celt, including myself, to totally escape
that heritage and its influence on the diverse ways in which we see the world. However, I do argue
for the need to attempt to at least engage with, and try to reduce, some of the worst mobilisations of
contemporary Anglo-Celtic identity. We can do better than John Howard, Pauline Hanson and even
Paul  Keating.  Furthermore  some  of  us  Anglo-Celts  have  experiences  of  being  in  subordinate
positions  through  other  identities,  through  being female,  male  blue  collar  working class  made
redundant  by globalisation,  being  gay or  lesbian.  They are  in  no  way equivalent  to  being  an
Indigenous person whose country is occupied, but they can give insights into what it feels like to be
in  a  subordinate  position.  And  just  as  feminists  facing  sexism  expect  men  to  take  some
responsibility for their own, just as gays and lesbians facing homophobia expect heterosexuals to
take some responsibility for their own, so Anglo-Celts should take primary responsibility for their
own (and ‘white’ Australians generally for other ‘white’ Australians). Isn’t this what Anglo-Celts
who went on freedom rides in the sixties or, more recently, sign sorry books or walk across Sydney
Harbour Bridge in reconciliation walks are already doing....?
I’m also conscious of the fact that if we don’t name Anglo-Celtic identity, it remains the unspoken,
unarticulated dominant universal. The problem here is very similar to the problem with whiteness
itself, which is hardly surprising given that Anglo-Celtic identity is the most influential form of
whiteness in our society. I’m reminded here of Marcia Langton’s analysis of Australian whiteness,
drawing on Richard Dyer:
.... how can we explain why those Australians who vote for the coalition
parties and their policies, to say nothing of voting for One Nation, still. at
the end of the twentieth century hold views characteristic of those held by
the makers of the Australian constitution a century ago? It is,  I propose,
because those white Australians do not see themselves as having a ‘race’. As
Richard Dyer ... puts it so succinctly: ‘As long as race is something only
applied to non-white people, as long as white people are not racially seen
and named, they/we function as a human norm. Other people are raced, we
are just people’. He argues that there is ‘no more powerful position than that
of being ‘just’ human’. The human can speak for all humanity, whereas the
raced can only speak for their race. But if we see, and speak of, whites as
raced, we ‘dislodge them/us from the position of power’ and undercut the
authority with which whites speak and act on the world.
Seen in this way, articulating Anglo-Celtness can be a way of undermining its authority. However, I
want to emphasise that the primary responsibility for handling the dysfunctional features of versions
of  Anglo-Celtic  identity,  in  its  racist  forms,  is  obviously  the  responsibility  of  Anglo-Celtic
Australians themselves. It certainly isn’t the responsibility of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
peoples to look after the tortured, not to say torturous, psyche of the invader.
Yet  another  possible  objection  to  encouraging  other  forms  of  Anglo-Celtic  identity  is  that
articulating  any  identity  necessarily  involves  exclusion  and  relations  of  domination  and
subordination. I agree that this can be a risk. However, I argue in my book Governing Change that
this argument relies to some extent on a form of de Saussurean linguistic reductionism and that the
way in which dominant and subordinate identities are formed is actually far more complex than this.
In particular, I argue that this view cannot adequately explain the ways in which some identities
achieve their dominance through forms of incorporation and assimilation that are very evident in
Australian  party  political  discourse  — forms  of  dominance  and  subordination  that  rely on  an
assumed and un-articulated universal. It is those discourses that I am interested in challenging here
and, while there are risks of exclusion, leaving conservative, racist articulations of Anglo-Celtic
identity unchallenged seems far more dangerous to me.
It therefore seems to me that even in the case of politicians such as Paul Keating we need to explore
who the ‘we’ is in his discourse. In one sense, it is obvious that, in the quote below, Keating is
referring to all non-Indigenous Australians and, I’ve argued earlier, that that is correct when looking
at  the  picture  overall  (while  not  denying  the  almost  total  dominance  of  white  colonial
settlers/invaders over other non-Indigenous ‘settlers’). In another sense, surely the ‘we’ particularly
refers to Anglo-Celts, given Keating’s Irish heritage:
It was we who did the disposessing.  We took the traditional lands and smashed the
traditional  way  of  life.  We  brought  the  diseases.  The  alcohol.  We  committed  the
murders.  We took the children from their  mothers. We practised discrimination and
exclusion. It was our ignorance and our prejudice.’
…it might help us if we non-Aboriginal Australians imagined ourselves dispossessed of
land we had lived on for fifty thousand years — and then imagined us being told that it
had never been ours. Imagine if ours was the oldest culture in the world and we were
told that it was worthless. Imagine if we had resisted this settlement, suffered and died
in defense of our land, and then were told in history books that we had given up without
a  fight....Imagine  if  our  spiritual  life  was  denied  and  ridiculed.  Imagine  if  we  had
suffered the injustice and then were blamed for it. It seems to me that if we can imagine
the injustice we can imagine its opposite.
Faced with  conservative  and  racist  versions  of  Anglo-Celtic  identity,  we also  need  to  imagine
another one. Isn’t this what Keating himself partly represented, however inadequately and whatever
his deficiencies (and those who had to compromise over his Native Title legislation, and even his
own Minister, Tickner, seem to be well aware of what those deficiencies were). Yet, part of the
problem is that Keating did not explicitly address the issue of Anglo-Celtic identity. He made lots of
statements about forging an inclusive national identity, he made lots of statements about valuing the
contributions of diverse social groups, that is the ‘other’, but he did not address the issue of Anglo
or Celtic identity in any detail, other than occasional references to his Irish heritage. I think this is a
problem and one that reveals that, even in Keating’s case, Anglo-Celtic identity was the unspoken,
assumed  identity  that  didn’t  need  to  be  specifically  mentioned  because  it  was  already  there,
occupying the centre.
In my view, we won’t have a properly multicultural society until Anglo-Celtic identity is recognised
as itself being an ethnic identity; as being one ethnic identity amongst others. We won’t have a
Treaty process until the majority of Anglo-Celts subscribe to more amenable forms of Anglo-Celtic
identity. If we are going to have a Treaty, the politicians of the left need to engage with and attempt
to mobilise Anglo-Celtic identity, not leave that mobilisation to the forces of reaction and racism.
Beasley has made some very good speeches on issues like The Stolen Generations but seems very
cautious when it comes to many other Indigenous issues, particularly the Treaty process. Ideally,
politicians of the right would be prepared to do that too, as older Liberal statesmen such as Malcolm
Fraser have attempted to do. (I would remind you that Liberal Party attitudes on Indigenous issues
have hardened greatly over the years, as even ex-Labor Ministers such as Tickner acknowledge).
Conclusion
So, I’m arguing that all parties need to take so-called ‘mainstream’ identities such as Britishness,
Englishness  or  Anglo-Celtic  identity seriously.  There  are  reasons  why many groups of  people,
including the powerful, can feel insecure in the modern world. Even Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, who is
a major critic of English racism, acknowledges that the English feel ‘lost’ and argues for the need to
construct a more positive English identity. The problem is that, precisely because of their powerful
position,  mainstream  identities  often  did  not  have  to  be  spelled  out.  They were  the  assumed
‘universal’ that everyone else was meant to aim to be like and be assimilated into. Consequently,
when their (largely) unquestioned superiority is challenged, so is a large part of what traditionally
constituted them. In these circumstances, a changing identity can easily be experienced as a loss of
identity (and this insecurity can be heightened if challenges to other forms of identity, such as class
or masculine identity, are being experienced as well). It then becomes even easier to mobilise racist
forms of this identity. The challenge for politicians is to try to encourage a positive sense of identity
for  traditionally powerful  ethnic  groups that  is  not  dependent  upon a  sense  of  racial  or  ethnic
superiority.
Above all, Australian (and British) politicians need to tackle an imperial past. Australian politicians
have  to  engage  with  the  legacies  of  Australia’s  colonial  settler  status,  including  issues  of
reconciliation. (They must also deal with the increasing racial and ethnic diversity in our settler
society). However, politicians also need to give those Australians of Anglo-Celtic origin a sense of
pride in the useful contributions which their ethnic group has made, and can continue to make, to
Australian society, at the same time as encouraging them to accept that they can no longer be the
privileged ethnic group that determines Australian identity and shapes/controls Australian society.
In particular, supporting the Treaty process needs to be turned into a positive aspect of Anglo-Celtic
identity; a sign of the courage and determination of Australian Anglo-Celts to face up to, and at
least partially right, the colonial settler injustices of the past and the present. I hope I’ve made it
clear that I am well aware of the dangers of engaging with and articulating Anglo-Celtic identity,
but if we don’t then, in my assessment at least, the Treaty process has little chance of success.
Discussion Session
Geoff Gray: I enjoyed that paper, Carol, and I thought you raised some really good issues. But I am
still confused as to what this Anglo-Celtic identity is, and how, in a sense, you identify that in
Australia as an Australian identity, and the conflation of that with whiteness, which I think broadens
out the problem [of an?] Anglo-Celtic white Australian identity. I wonder if you would care to
[comment on that?]
Carol Johnson: I think those are good issues. It is particularly a problem that in this paper mainly
concentrates on what has been happening in the discourse of politicians, which does not necessarily
reflect what has been happening in wider Australia.
I guess my position would be this: Anglo-Celtic identity in Australia is the dominant form of
whiteness. It has been, if you like, the litmus test for whiteness. Indeed, historically in Australia
there have been periods of time when, for example, Greeks and Italians were not considered to be
white, when Turks were not considered to be white. This is one of the issues, that the people who
were indisputably considered to be white were the Anglo-Celts. So it has been very important in
deciding what whiteness is in our country, but of course we know that whiteness is a constructed
category.
The other issue is that in some ways anyone who came to this country after the point of invasion is
an invader, regardless of whether they are Anglo-Celtic or Italian or Greek or Lebanese or whatever.
Anglo-Celts might have a particular relationship historically to the process of British colonialism,
but obviously the ranks of the invaders are much larger than the Anglo-Celts. In my view they
would include people who came long after the 18th century. My parents came in the 1950s, and I
came in the 1950s as a baby, but we are still benefiting from that legacy of dispossession, aren’t we?
In a way I feel that all I have any right to talk to is what form the, if you like, post-colonial version
of Anglo-Celtic identity might take, if such a thing is possible. I think that people from other non-
Indigenous ethnic groups need to work out what their forms of post-colonial identity would take.
That is, in a way, another project. While I think that is a very important project and it will also
influence the Treaty process, the crucial ethnic identity in Australia today is the Anglo-Celtic one,
and particularly the way it has been mobilised, in my view, by both Hanson and Howard.
Richard Davis: Just a couple of points: I am interested that you raised William Hague and Tony
Blair. The English historian, who once used the term the ‘mongrel English nation’ had a far less
clear idea about what Englishness consisted of; since the middle of the nineteenth century it is quite
recognised, this kind of mixed immigrant nature of the English population. It is interesting to note
that someone like Hague or Blair, who represents I guess in a class-based society fairly elite
interests, not surprising would claim a clear sense of whiteness.
The other point is that 100 years ago , quite literally, very similar debates on this occurred in
Australia and in America about the threat that colonised people posed to developing nations. It was
partly because Black Americans were gaining a certain amount of rights. They were, in
demographic terms, the majority in the South. They posed a great threat to the white institutions in
the South. There is a similar debate starting to occur in Australia and other parts of the colonised
world. So the threat to whiteness, the threat to the nation, has a precedent and is not dissimilar,
although for different reasons, to what was occurring 100 years ago in exactly the same countries.
Carol Johnson: Indeed you could go further than that and say that the whole idea of Australia was
shot through with the need to distance ourselves from Asia. But that has always been a theme in
Australian political history. You are absolutely right. I think what has made it stronger now is the
fact, although the European empires have declined, globalisation means that various Asian and
other economies, despite the Asian meltdown, are now seen as being a far more serious threat to the
West than they were previously. I think in the Australian case what has happened is that, to state the
obvious, the White Australia policy has ended. (When you look sometimes at the detention camps
in Western Australia you wonder whether it has ended and you wonder whether there are
particularly strange definitions of whiteness is at work again today, but basically the White Australia
Policy per se has ended.) We now have migration from very diverse ethnic groups—I have not got
the precise figures on me – but now a very small minority of the current migrant intake that is from
Britain, whereas even about 20 years ago it still was about 55 per cent from England. So there are
extra, additional challenges, although I agree that the discourse is an extremely old one.
Marian Sawer: That was really interesting, Carol, and this whole story about the attempt to
mobilise an Anglo-Celtic identity is an interesting feature of current conservative politics. But I am
not sure whether it really has much scope in terms of a coherent identity. The coherence of that kind
of British race did not rest on the deeds of the Empire, the idea that Australians were rejuvenating
the British race and all that sort of stuff. When you have not got the Empire, as you have suggested,
there is not much coherence, as you can indeed see in the United Kingdom. The English identity, all
those St George crosses flying everywhere now as a response to the upsurge of Scottish identity,
Welsh identity, Manx identity, Cornish identity, Pictish identity – all of these things are threatening,
as you suggest, a dominant cultural identity. That brings me to my question: what is the future of a
non-ethnicised national identity, one based on Donald Horne’s ‘civic culture’ , those culture values,
but non-ethnicised, because I do not see much future in any kind of Anglo-Celtic identity?
Carol Johnson: I guess my response to the first part of your question would be that I do not think
that identities have to necessarily be coherent to work. Indeed if you think of John Howard’s
mobilisation of Anglo-Celtic identity prior to the 1996 election, it was very rarely made explicit. All
that needed to be there was references to political correctness, the mainstream, Aboriginal industry,
various other key words. They were ways of mobilising particular voters without necessarily
coherently and explicitly spelling out the terms of what this meant.
It is interesting that you say, with the links to Britain too, that identity is in decline, which I am sure
it is. On the other hand, it interested me the other day when Bob Hawke said in the Labor Party
address, in effect: ‘How come we’re not prepared to take responsibility for the Stolen Generations
but we still see the past generations at Gallipoli as shaping our identity? We weren’t at Gallipoli,
just as we personally may not have been involved in stealing Aboriginal children.’ My response to
that would be that the reason why Gallipoli is being invoked so much is precisely that ‘we’ were
there, and that Gallipoli is partly being invoked as a story of Anglo-Celtic identity . Who was at
Gallipoli? It was the predecessors of the major postwar immigration Australia that was at Gallipoli.
It was also, of course, a male Australia and various other things. So I would argue that that is being
invoked in some really interesting ways now.
In terms of the future of values that are not ethnicised—despite my talking a lot about Anglo-Celtic
ethnicity—, in a strange way that is precisely what I am arguing for when I say that core values
should not be identified with Anglo-Celtic ethnicity. Indeed, Paul Keating had some interesting
comments when talking about the relationship with Britain. He said in effect, ‘Some people say we
got our parliamentary democracy straight from Britain. Well, we might have got parliamentary
democracy from Britain but of course we also introduced universal suffrage for both men and
women, payment for politicians and a secret ballot, many, many years before the British did.’ So our
parliamentary values and our form of parliamentary democracy were ones that we developed
ourselves, with a bit of input from other places including the United States.
Talking about what Australian core values would be, he said, ‘Well, one of the Australian core
values is’ – maybe he was being a bit optimistic in that, and should have said ‘should be’ –
supporting diversity and that comes precisely from our history of immigration and ethnicities that
are living together.
When you look at arguments like this, you can begin to see what were the national values and a
national identity that were not related to particular ethnic groups. Obviously all these identities are
constructed. I am not arguing that they have some sort of essentialist meaning; they are all
constructed. But I guess my problem is that, a bit like the issue of whiteness in Marcia Langton’s
quotation, I just think that even if we do not articulate Anglo-Celtic identity it is very much still
there as the assumed universal. In a way my argument would be that to get beyond these ethnic
identities you almost have to articulate them first.
Barry Hindess: Thanks, Carol. I found that very thought-provoking, especially in my present
situation as someone who is very much an Anglo by background and education and who has been
working recently on British colonial history, not just in Australia but the Empire more generally. It
is the kind of work that makes me, frankly, extremely uncomfortable with assuming an Anglo
identity. I would, in fact, rather not have to do that. (As often as possible I pretend that I am
something else, something I am more comfortable with than actually pushing my own Anglo-ness.)
Part of looking at the history of British colonialism brings up some slightly tangential reflections on
Englishness. One reflection would be in response to your question, ‘If you take away the Empire,
what is left?’ If you take away the Empire, what is left is at least three things I can think of, for the
English at least. One is Europe, which is not available to Australia but is very much available to
Britain. Another is the West, which is still available to us in Australia. And a third is something
which I picked up from some British historian some time ago, the idea of the ‘imperialism of free
trade’. When the term was initially coined, it was designed to refer to the British Empire during part
of the 19th century, during a period when the British state was not particularly keen on further
imperial expansion—it had something else going forward. But the term has been introduced more
recently to refer to the ‘new world order’ following the Second World War, the world order in
which the United States is the dominant power and in which the Brits—and the Australians, indeed
—can see themselves playing a part, a minor part but nevertheless they are still part of this order, in
some way.
All of those lamenting that their part of the empire in one sense has gone still carry with them a
sense of our superiority over various others. So it seems to me that there are a whole range of
identities are available to the Anglos, the Anglo-Celts and a variety of other Westerners and
Europeans to cope with the loss of empire. And most of the ones that are available in this present
world are ones which still evoke this notion of our superiority over other races.
That brings me to a second, and I hope shorter, comment. You said in your talk, I think absolutely
rightly, that colonialism is ongoing. I think that quite clearly, in teasing out the significance of that
idea, one way it is ongoing is in the Australian Constitution, and indeed in the constitution of other
Western societies. It is ongoing in the constitutional assumption which Jim Tully designates as the
‘empire of uniformity’, in the assumption that in a civilised society there will be a uniform
relationship between citizens and the state of which they are a part, which of course implies that
those who do not fall into that uniform [attitude?] and who seek a different kind of relationship will
be seen not simply as difficult but as in some significant respects lesser.
The reason I think those two kinds of concerns go together is that the ongoing use of the term
‘Western culture’, especially, is easily tied in to the sense of Anglo or Anglo-Celtic identity. But it
also can be separated from it in some way, so that one could, indeed, buy into a kind of broader
European multiculturalism, dissociating oneself from Anglo-ness but still buying into the other kind
of identities assumed within the frame of the Constitution. And particularly when the issues you are
focusing on are actually even worse, more complex, than your talk was suggesting.
Carol Johnson: Yes, they are worse and more complex than my talk suggested. Part of that is the
problem of having to give papers in 40 minutes. I tried to hint that I am aware of what some of the
dangers are, and I am certainly not trying to suggest that just by getting rid of those particular forms
of British identity involving the Empire you somehow get rid of the forms of superiority. In fact, I
have written a paper about Blair’s attempt to establish what I call a ‘virtual empire’ by saying in
effect, ‘Britain is going to be at the cutting edge of new information technology and we are once
again going to lead the world through new information technology.’
Those forms are evident, and he specifically situates them in the context of decline of empire, the
growth of the United States, China and other countries, saying in effect, ‘But this is where our
British attributes of inventiveness can come to the fore. Just as we started the Industrial Revolution,
so the work of Babbage and Turing started the information revolution and we will lead the world
again.’ So those tendencies are very much still there, I totally agree.
I am also sympathetic to your argument that often one would rather not identify one’s ethnic
background as Anglo . There are multiple ways in which I identify at various times and in different
situations, but there comes a point when, if I am asked what my ethnic background is, then I will
say, ‘Actually, I was born in England.’ That might have particular meanings for me too, because I
come from the north of England, a very industrial area. But it seems to me that if you do not have
some sort of ethnic identity, what is your identity? Do you just say, ‘I am Australian’? Are you
saying, in effect, ‘Well, you’re a Greek Australian,’ ‘You’re an Italian Australian,’ ‘You’re a
Lebanese Australian,’ and ‘I’m just Australian’? That is the dilemma of what the situation is when
you do not articulate some sort of ethnic identity, however ambiguous you feel about it. You can
end up in a situation where you are the unspoken, assumed universal, rather than saying, ‘Oh, you’re
a Greek Australian. Yes, I’m an Anglo-Celtic Australian.’ That is one of the issues I am trying to
address, but more importantly I am trying to address the fact that a significant section of the voting
population seems to have been influenced by arguments about special interests, about Anglo-Celts
being discriminated against by these special interests that are getting benefits that they are not.
There are all sorts of arguments you could have about that, but it seems to me that you have to
engage with those things and to say, ‘Well look, actually the Treaty process is not going to be bad
for Anglo-Celts.’ One could also say that, if you are involved in a Treaty process, that is actually
saying that Australian Anglo-Celts are prepared to face up to issues of colonialism.
I must admit to being somewhat hesitant about some of these arguments, seeing this in some ways
as a work-in-progress paper, because I do see the dilemmas as being enormous. just as I see the risks
of vacating the ground to others as being even greater.
Ellie Gilbert: I think it is also really important to look at the proper identity of the Aboriginal
nations that you are talking in about the Treaty process, because this whole thing of us getting all
channeled into the one Treaty which is totally denying the true identity of all these hundreds of
nations who have their own laws. Unless this process is going to let that law system breathe again, it
is just [inaudible]. I have a problem with the current Treaty movement because through the ’80s I
was so involved with Kevin on the grassroots one and then all of a sudden when the Walk across the
Bridge is happening, everybody’s got a Treaty sticker on. That’s when even Evelyn Scott went
public and talked about how the brothers had gone behind her back.
What happened was the multinational companies, the pastoralists and the right wing are now
pushing the Treaty process. I don’t think most people are aware of that. So it is what you called the
imperialism of free trade. That is what is pushing this Treaty process at the moment. It is all written
up in an article in the Financial Review on 31 March 2000, about the Bennelong ‘secret society’,
naming players including Patrick Dodson as an architect, Ian Tuxworth and everyone. It is the way
that the multinationals and the pastoralists can get out of the native title process. Apart from the Act
itself, the actual native title as it was accepted in Mabo is a law and a right and a title prior to British
law and Australian law. And this is the real issue that we are dealing with. All this other stuff is
absolute smokescreen. The real issue is that what is called native title is a superior title to anything
that Britain and Australia can claim. Ultimately when proper recognition is given the Indigenous
nations, it is going to be the non-Aboriginal Australians who have to come to Aboriginal Australia
to negotiate their right to be here.
I was at the HREOC racism summit last week when Marcia put up the statistics that the
Commission was working on. There could be a million Aboriginal people in Australia by the year
2010, because of a high rate of identification. So if you accept a doubling time of 10 years, which it
is in some areas, it is only 50 years before the black–white population is 50:50. If the doubling time
is 20 years, it is only 100 years. There will not be a way that the so-called white Anglo-Celts are
going to maintain their superiority. I really think that notion of superiority has to be dismantled to
show that it was an absolutely false premise that led to all this destruction around the world.
So I do not think it is something that has to be—in spite of what you are trying to say—gathered up
and made into something. I think it is worth dismantling its power, because we are still living under
a white supremacy power. In fact in Canberra they are trying to take children away. It is happening
today. We have had an instance within the last two months, a concerted effort between housing, the
police and welfare officers. It was only because someone was there to actually front the police and
say, ‘No, you’re not taking those children’ that it didn’t happen. We are surrounded right now by a
genocidal society. I think that people are waking up to ask, ‘Why is it that we haven’t got a law
against genocide? Why is it that Howard’s chief legal adviser says we deliberately don’t have a law
against genocide?’ They know what the population is going to do, and they’re flat out. That’s why
everyone is locked up and we’ve got all these deaths occurring. They’re flat out trying to contain it
till next time.
Carol Johnson: Thanks for that question. That was very useful. I take your point about the Treaty
process. I am certainly not an expert on the history of treaties, but it seems to me that there are a
number of different histories of how issues of the Treaty come up, and it goes back a very long time
and it has come up from different Aboriginal peoples in different contexts. Certainly that is the
account that Marcia Langton gives of it, for example, and Geoff Clark to some extent too. I certainly
think there are issues about what form of Treaty you want to have, and acknowledge that even if you
see it as being a Treaty between Aboriginal Australia and non-Indigenous Australia, as two nations,
that then obviously opens the issue of seeing Aboriginal Australia as one nation rather than as a
large number of Aboriginal peoples. So I acknowledge that those are major problems.
At the same time, it seems to me that lots of conservative forces in Australian society are very
challenged by the concept of a Treaty. I will certainly have a look at that Financial Review article,
which I haven’t seen, I must admit, but I will follow it up. You can certainly see that in Howard’s
arguments, that if you begin the Treaty process then it is acknowledging that Aboriginal sovereignty
still exists, and that it was not abolished. I think because of that it is an important issue still to
pursue.
In terms of trying to get rid of the idea of Anglo-Celtic dominance and superiority, yes, I totally
agree with you that I think that is a job for everyone to do, from their various perspectives. I guess
as an Anglo-Celt, though, I do feel a particular responsibility. If I am sitting in a room and a man in
that room makes a particularly sexist and obnoxious comment, then I often won’t immediately rip
in; I’ll sit and wait to see if the other men are going to say something about it, whether they are
going to do something about one of their own. I guess as an Anglo-Celt I feel a bit in that position
too, that we can’t sit there and wait for other people to say, ‘That’s rubbish, that’s offensive,’ or
whatever. We actually need to be in there contesting it ourselves. That is one of the points that I was
trying to make. One of the reasons we might want to be in there contesting it ourselves is in a way
self-interest. In the last few years one has felt particularly ashamed to be an Anglo-Celtic Australian,
as indeed one has felt particularly ashamed to be a white Australian as the United Nations comes out
condemning us. I think we all have a stake in trying to get a better outcome in some way.
[Qb]: My comment relates back to one made about the various interpretations, particularly from
Britain’s point of view. I was wondering why the Commonwealth was left out here. Was that seen
as a continuation of empire? Certainly as far as Howard seems to be concerned, this is one way of
reinforcing that image that he seems to have. One of the most interesting things – and it is not a
question so much as a bit of information – the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet at the
moment is looking at the possibility of streaming entrants to the country as Commonwealth citizens
and ‘other ranks’.
Carol Johnson: Is that right? That’s come up again?
[Qb] It’s come up again, and I just thought people ought to be aware that this is at least in the
discussion stage.
Carol Johnson: That is very interesting. I would have thought it also would have had racial effects
that Howard possibly has not actually come to terms with, which would be very interesting. It
makes you wonder what he perceives the Commonwealth to be. Does he still perceive the
Commonwealth to be white?
I spent some time in England doing research recently and I went through a whole lot of statements
that Howard had made about relationships with Britain, and he certainly still sees it in very
traditional terms. I am sure that part of his emphasis on the Commonwealth is that, but also I
suppose he might see it as being a convenient way of trying to deal with refugees who are coming
from the Middle East at present. But if you look at immigration to Britain, using some versions of
Commonwealth citizenship, then of course it is not going to be Zimbabwean white farmers who
necessarily will be pouring into Australia; it might be African Caribbean people and people from the
Subcontinent, which would be very interesting to see Howard and Ruddock deal with. But that is
extraordinary.
Robert Janssen: I think this discussion is very useful for this seminar series, that a Treaty debate
can tend to focus entirely on questions of Aboriginal rights and that we need to look at the other side
of who is going to negotiate this Treaty.
My recent experience tends to provide a bit of evidence that the Anglo-Celtic identity—and as with
you I do not see that as a coherent sort of thing but rather a dominant cultural influence in Australia
– is not very permeable, in a sense that Australian representation through the Parliament, whoever
represents the state and the Crown, seems to be quite Anglo-Celtic just by privilege in terms of who
gets jobs. That sort of identity is not very permeable, in that we have consistently failed to engage in
Asia because we are hopeless at it; we have consistently failed to appreciate Indigenous experience,
because we don’t understand it. And the Anglo-Celtic identity is incapable of understanding quite
diverse cultures, whether Asian or Indigenous.
That concerns me in a sense that if the Treaty comes down to a situation of the state, represented by
the parliament – probably represented by the executive – I fear that they are not capable of the
negotiation with Aboriginal nations . They are not able to engage in that negotiation. They will be
able to engage in a debate where they want to win or they want to subjugate cultures; they are not
able to negotiate in a sense of giving and taking something. I just wonder whether your reflections
on this, much more sophisticated than mine, have anything that might reflect on the permeability of
the dominant culture.
Carol Johnson: Certainly the experience of recent years suggests that it is not very permeable. I
take your point about who is going to be doing the negotiation for the Australian government. I
assume that this is partly the problem that was worrying Geoff Clark when he made a call to set up
some sort of Treaty Commission that would have a wider representation and at least be able to come
up with some recommendations. But of course then what the force of those recommendations would
have, I am not sure about.
It seems to me that Australian society can do a lot better than it has. The Canadians are streaks
ahead of us at the moment, whatever their problems. Other societies have been able to say sorry on
all sorts of issues in ways that we can’t. I think there will be enormous problems in the Treaty
process, but it is something that we still have to attempt to do. I am not sure how you deal with that
issue of who is going to be negotiating things from the government’s point of view. You look at the
senior echelons of the Public Service, you look at the nature of parliament itself, and it is not a very
good picture.
Lisa Strelein: If there are no other questions, Carol, do you want to say anything else by way
clarification?
Carol Johnson: No, just thanks. I have got some really useful comments. That has been incredibly
helpful to me too, so thank you very much.
Lisa Strelein: We will finish up there, and thank Carol very much for coming all the way to talk to
us today.
